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authorGravatar Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>2020-03-30 23:54:25 +0200
committerGravatar Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>2020-04-08 13:43:31 +0200
commitc15d95ae23d2cbd066a9d9b627b4026eb8ec0346 (patch)
treebe8a0e52f8d3f171155cfd6137d784c76abb949c
parente5eeda60b6d075134b3d1d0d01852f3553a03b7a (diff)
downloadbuildroot-c15d95ae23d2cbd066a9d9b627b4026eb8ec0346.tar.gz
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package/hostapd: fix CVE-2019-16275
hostapd before 2.10 and wpa_supplicant before 2.10 allow an incorrect indication of disconnection in certain situations because source address validation is mishandled. This is a denial of service that should have been prevented by PMF (aka management frame protection). The attacker must send a crafted 802.11 frame from a location that is within the 802.11 communications range. Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> (cherry picked from commit 749fbab0bb4bad3748d164f8c25485618f0ed1ce) Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
-rw-r--r--package/hostapd/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch77
-rw-r--r--package/hostapd/hostapd.mk4
2 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/hostapd/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch b/package/hostapd/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..959788c2e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/hostapd/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
+ address
+
+Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
+so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
+sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
+sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
+out a response to another device and that other device processing the
+unexpected response.
+
+In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
+where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
+connected station dropping its association.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
+[Retrieved from:
+https://w1.fi/security/2019-7/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch]
+---
+ src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
++++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
+ "hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
+ return -1;
+ }
++
++ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
++ is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
++ os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
++ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
++ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
++ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
++ " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
++ __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
+
+ hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
+ fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
+ stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
+
++ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
++ is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
++ os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
++ /* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
++ * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
++ * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
++ " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
++ MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
+ handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
+ return 1;
+--
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk b/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk
index f8c144c236..b94a0e4578 100644
--- a/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk
+++ b/package/hostapd/hostapd.mk
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ HOSTAPD_DEPENDENCIES = host-pkgconf
HOSTAPD_CFLAGS = $(TARGET_CFLAGS)
HOSTAPD_LICENSE = BSD-3-Clause
HOSTAPD_LICENSE_FILES = README
+
+# 0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
+HOSTAPD_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-16275
+
HOSTAPD_CONFIG_SET =
HOSTAPD_CONFIG_ENABLE = \