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author | 2020-11-23 14:15:06 +0100 | |
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committer | 2020-12-21 15:16:08 +0100 | |
commit | 325e8e89f6db6db8746c85b2b8dd87ba06266235 (patch) | |
tree | d62b1f38ced8b61fec317bbe4f75f3e3aef26741 | |
parent | 10def0dc85a0551256549f69c7e70f487bc9817e (diff) | |
download | buildroot-325e8e89f6db6db8746c85b2b8dd87ba06266235.tar.gz buildroot-325e8e89f6db6db8746c85b2b8dd87ba06266235.tar.bz2 |
boot/arm-trusted-firmware: Forward stack protection configuration
TF-A supports stack smashing protection (-fstack-protector-*).
However, that feature is currently silently disabled because
ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR is not set during build time.
As documented in the TF-A user guide, the flag ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR
is required to enable stack protection support. When enabled the symbols
for the stack protector (e.g. __stack_chk_guard) are built.
This needs to be done because TF-A does not link against an external
library that provides that symbols (e.g. libc).
So in case we see that BR2_SSP_* is enabled, let's enable the corresponding
ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR build flag for TF-A as documented in the TF-A user guide.
This patch also fixes a the following linker errors with older TF-A versions
if BR2_SSP_* is enabled (i.e. -fstack-protector-* is used as compiler flag)
and ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR is not set, which are caused by the missing
stack protector symbols:
[...]
params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0xc): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x14): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x104): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x118): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_fail'
aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: ./build/px30/release/bl31/pmu.o: in function `rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend':
pmu.c:(.text.rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend+0xc): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
[...]
TF-A releases after Nov 2019, that include 7af195e29a4, will circumvent
these issue by explicitliy and silently disabling the stack protector
by appending '-fno-stack-protector' to the compiler flags in case
ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR is not set.
Tested on a Rockchip PX30 based system (TF-A v2.2 and upstream/master).
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3fcbcdaa8cb6a99208399d1402c837685d7639)
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
-rw-r--r-- | boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk | 8 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk b/boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk index a3553e36cf..0597cecf71 100644 --- a/boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk +++ b/boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk @@ -100,6 +100,14 @@ ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += MV_DDR_PATH=$(MV_DDR_MARVELL_DIR) ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_DEPENDENCIES += mv-ddr-marvell endif +ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y) +ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=default +else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y) +ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=strong +else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y) +ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=all +endif + ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_TARGETS = all ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_FIP),y) |